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BALANCING DOMESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY VIABILITY 
WITH INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: IMMINENT CHANGES TO 
NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS 
 
H. Brendan Burke* 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In August 2013, the Department of Energy (DoE) promulgated a 
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNOPR) 1  to revise the 
Code of Federal Regulations title 10, part 810 (part 810). Part 810 is 
titled "Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities" and implements 
section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by section 
302 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.2 Part 810 controls the 
export of technology pertaining to special nuclear material (SNM) and its 
production outside the United States by U.S. citizens or corporations.3 Its 
purpose is to protect national security interests relating to nuclear 
nonproliferation while facilitating civil nuclear trade.4 
The most noteworthy changes in the proposed revision pertain to how 
potential trade partner host countries are classified. This classification 
directly affects the volume of regulatory requirements applicable to 
transactions with the individual destination countries. 
This article will explain the proposed changes in the country 
classification scheme, analyze the rationales driving the proposal, and 
assess whether implementation of the proposed rule is likely to 
successfully achieve the balance between security and commercial 
interests. Ultimately this article argues that while the revised destination                                                         
* Commander, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Navy.  B.J., University of 
Missouri, 1995. J.D., Stetson University College of Law, 2005. LL.M., The George Washington 
University School of Law, 2014. Presently assigned as Officer in Charge, Region Legal Service 
Office Mid-Atlantic Detachment Groton, Conn. An earlier version of this article was prepared in 
partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws in Energy and 
Environmental Law at The George Washington University School of Law. The author thanks 
Professors Larry Brown and Charles Abernathy for their guidance in the preparation of this article. 
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the United States Navy, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government. 
1 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, 78 FED. REG. 46,829 (proposed Aug. 2, 
2013). The August 2013 proposal was a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNOPR) 
following an earlier proposal in 2011. See Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, 76 FED. 
REG. 55,278 (proposed Sept. 7, 2011). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2077(b) (2012). Section 57b makes it “unlawful to directly or indirectly engage 
or participate in the development or production of any special nuclear material outside of the United 
States except . . . (1) as specifically authorized under an agreement for cooperation made pursuant to 
section [123 of the Act] . . ., or (2) upon authorization by the Secretary of Energy after a 
determination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States.” The first 
exception refers to agreements for peaceful cooperation (section 123 agreements) between the 
United States and partner nations. See discussion of section 123 agreements at the text associated 
with notes 13-16, infra. The second exception pertains to the transactions covered by part 810. 
3 10 C.F.R. § 810.1. 
4 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 55,278. 
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country classification scheme may be as administratively burdensome to 
U.S. nuclear vendors as the present scheme, it is still legally permissible 
and defensible on security policy grounds. 
Part 810 currently lists seventy-seven countries for which a U.S. 
citizen or corporation must seek “specific authorization” from the 
Secretary of Energy before transferring technology pertaining to the 
production or processing of SNM.5 These countries are referred to in 
shorthand parlance as “SA countries” (for “specific authorization”). 6 
Under the current regulatory construct, all countries not listed among the 
seventy-seven SA countries are presumed to be generally authorized 
(GA) by the Secretary to receive SNM technology transfers. 
By contrast, the SNOPR proposes to dispense with the negative list of 
SA countries and instead include an appendix with a positive list of 
forty-eight GA countries plus the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). 7  Countries could be added to or removed from the GA list 
through additional public notice rulemaking. 8  Similar to the present 
presumption that unlisted countries are classified as GA, the proposed 
rule implies that unlisted countries are to be characterized as SA. 
But the switch from a negative listing to a positive listing was not as 
simple as reversing the list (i.e., just listing all previously unlisted 
countries). Three countries that are currently on the SA list in § 
810.8(a)—Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates 
(U.A.E.)—are proposed as enumerated GA countries in the SNOPR.9 
Additionally, there are seventy-seven countries 10  that are listed 
neither in the present § 810.8(a) SA list nor the SNOPR’s proposed GA                                                         
5  10 C.F.R. § 810.8(a). The seventy-seven countries are Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, 
Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burma 
(Myanmar), Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, 
Comoros, Congo (Zaire), Cuba, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Niger, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, and 
Yugoslavia. Id. SNM is defined as “(1) plutonium, (2) uranium-233, or uranium enriched above 
0.711 percent by weight in the isotope uranium-235.” 10 C.F.R. § 810.3. 
6 It would be incorrect to use the term “specifically authorized country;” it is not the countries 
themselves who are ultimately “authorized,” but rather individual transactions on a case-by-case 
basis. See, e.g., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACT—SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF 
PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 10 CFR 810, (Jan. 13, 2013) (referring to “SA” and “GA” (generally 
authorized) countries throughout the document), available at 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/1994-AA02-DOE-RIA.pdf. 
7 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,831. The forty-eight 
enumerated GA countries in the SNOPR are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Korea, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 46,849–50. 
8 Id. at 46,835. 
9 Id. at 46,849–50. 
10 The seventy-seven unlisted (in the SNOPR) countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Curaçao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
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list (coincidentally the same number presently listed as SA—there is no 
further numeric significance, and there is no overlap between the two 
lists of seventy-seven). This means that those seventy-seven are countries 
presently classified as GA, but will become SA countries (subject to 
tighter export restrictions as discussed below) when part 810 is revised 
per the SNOPR. Nuclear energy industry advocates take particular issue 
with this aspect of the proposed rule.11 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, part 810 implements Section 57b of 
the AEA. 12  Section 57b makes it unlawful for a U.S. citizen or 
corporation to “engage or participate in the development or production of 
[SNM] outside of the United States” with two exceptions: (1) pursuant to 
a bilateral agreement under section 123 of the AEA; 13  or (2) as 
authorized by the Secretary of Energy “after a determination that such 
activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States.”14 
Section 123 agreements are government-to-government agreements 
that pertain to peaceful cooperation on civil nuclear power development. 
There are nine statutory requirements to execute a section 123 
agreement: (1) a guarantee by the host country to maintain the safeguards 
set forth in the agreement; (2) agreement by non-nuclear weapons 
countries to maintain IAEA safeguards for peaceful nuclear materials; 
(3) a guarantee that no materials or technology subject to the agreement 
will be used for nuclear weapons research or detonation; (4) a stipulation 
that the United States may reclaim any materials if the partner nation                                                                                                                             
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kiribati, Kosovo, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, 
Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vatican City, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  See DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACT—SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 
10 CFR 810, supra note 6, at 17-20 (listing countries whose status will change under the SNOPR). 
The Analysis of Economic Impact actually lists three additional countries with the above seventy-
seven as changing from GA to SA. Congo and Palau are presumably listed in error, as each is 
presently designated SA. 10 C.F.R. § 810.8(a). Also listed is “Western Sahara,” which is a disputed 
state administered by Morocco. DEP'T OF STATE, WESTERN SAHARA 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 
(last accessed Nov. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204600.pdf. Adding the proposed new SA countries to 
those currently enumerated (less Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and U.A.E., which are proposed to be GA as 
discussed at the text associated with note 9 supra, and Yugoslavia, which is defunct) would bring the 
total number of recognized SA countries to 150. 
11 See generally, Letter from Richard J. Myers, Vice President of Policy Dev., Planning, and 
Supplier Programs, Nuclear Energy Inst., to Richard Goorevich, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of 
Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., Nat’l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Energy, Proposed Rule on 
Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities (Dec. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/NEIComments_DOE_Proposed_Rule_Exports810
_120711.pdf. 
12 10 C.F.R. § 810.1. 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2077(b)(1). Section 123 of the AEA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2153. 
14 42 U.S.C. § 2077(b)(2). 
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detonates a nuclear explosive device or otherwise abrogates IAEA 
safeguards; (5) a guarantee that no materials or technology subject to the 
agreement will be transferred to a third party; (6) a guarantee to maintain 
adequate physical security; (7) an agreement not to reprocess, enrich, or 
otherwise alter SNM without prior approval by the United States; (8) an 
agreement not to store SNM without prior approval; and (9) a guarantee 
that all SNM produced or facilities constructed as a result of the transfer 
will be subject to the requirements of the agreement.15 The agreements 
are negotiated by the State Department and ultimately approved by 
Congress.16 Transactions that are specifically contemplated by a section 
123 agreement do not require further intervention by the Secretaries of 
State or Energy.17 
Export transactions not contemplated by an existing section 123 
agreement, however, trigger the authorization regimen in AEA § 57b(2), 
as implemented by part 810. The current iteration of part 810 has a short 
but broad list of activities that require specific authorization by the 
Secretary of Energy: (1) production of SNM in any of the seventy-seven 
enumerated SA countries; (2) providing “sensitive nuclear technology for 
an activity in any foreign country” (regardless of the country’s part 810 
classification); and (3) providing assistance or training in certain matters 
(again regardless of the country’s part 810 classification).18 Regarding 
the first activity on that list (production of SNM), transactions with 
countries not enumerated as SA are presumed to be GA by the Secretary 
of Energy. 
An application for specific authorization can take longer than two 
years to be approved.19 The process involves interagency coordination 
between the Departments of Energy, State, Defense, and Commerce, as 
well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.20 The final authorization, as 
stated above, requires an ultimate determination by the Secretary of 
Energy that the proposed “activity will not be inimical to the interest of 
the United States.” 21  The inimicality determination and specific 
authorization are not delegable below the secretarial level.22 
                                                        
15 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 2153. 
17 42 U.S.C. § 2077(b)(1). 
18 10 C.F.R. § 810.8. 
19 Office of Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., Nat’l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Energy, 
Proposed Changes to DOE Part 810—Assistance to Foreign Nuclear Activities (slide presentation 
for Nov. 18, 2013, public meeting for comment on the SNOPR), slide 6, available at 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/11-13-inlinefiles/2013-11-20%20SNOPR.pdf. 
20 Id. 
21 10 U.S.C. § 2077(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
22 Richard Goorevich, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., Nat’l 
Nuclear Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Energy, comments at Nov. 15, 2013, public meeting regarding the 
SNOPR, transcript page 53, available at http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/11-13-
inlinefiles/2013-11-22%20Proposed%20Changes%20to%20DOE%20Part%20810%20(11-15-
2013).pdf. There is no express standard or definition of “inimical” or “inimicality" in AEA § 57b of 
part 810. Webster’s New World Dictionary defines inimical as “like an enemy; hostile; unfriendly” 
or “in opposition; adverse; unfavorable.” 
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By contrast, export transactions contemplated by AEA § 57b(2) and 
part 810 with GA countries only trigger a reporting requirement to 
DoE. 23 The GA process is therefore vastly preferred by vendors and 
customers alike.24 
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), an organization advocating for 
interests of the nuclear industry in the United States and abroad, asserts 
that the “specific authorization requirement imposes a heavy burden on 
exporters” in terms of time and money.25 It logically follows, then, that 
industry would prefer a regulatory scheme featuring more GA countries 
and activities, and fewer SA countries and activities. 
 
III. IMPETUS FOR REVISION TO PART 810 
 
The proposed revision to part 810 reflects an effort by DoE “to make 
the regulations consistent with current global civil nuclear trade practices 
and nonproliferation norms and to update the activities and technologies 
subject to the Secretary of Energy’s specific authorization and DoE 
reporting requirements.”26 Regarding trade practices, the drafters noticed 
that the intervening years since the last comprehensive part 810 update 
had seen the emergence of new vendors from new markets competing 
with U.S. suppliers as well as the development of new technologies like 
small modular reactors.27 
Regarding security and nonproliferation, events in countries like Iraq, 
Libya, and Malaysia caused regulators to consider “new political 
relationships and . . . new realities moving forward.”28 
In bringing part 810 into the twenty-first century, then, DoE’s aims 
were fourfold: “[1] Effective threat reduction in a changing world[; 2] 
Open, transparent, predictable, and understandable regulation[; 3] 
Efficient regulation that performs the mission without wasting time or 
money[; and 4] Effective nuclear trade support for companies competing 
[in] global civil nuclear markets[.]”29 In short, the SNOPR’s putative 
goal is to strike “a balance to promote trade without increasing 
proliferation risk.”30                                                         
23 Office of Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., Nat’l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Energy, 
Proposed Changes to DOE Part 810—Assistance to Foreign Nuclear Activities (slide presentation 
for Aug. 5, 2013, public meeting for comment on the SNOPR), slide 5, available at 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default 
/files/nnsa/08-13-inlinefiles/2013-08-
05%20Master%20810%20Rollout%20Presentation%20Final%208-5-2013_Clean%20to%20PA.pdf. 
24 Myers, supra note 11, attachment 1, page 9. 
25 Id. at attachment 1, page 8. NEI goes on to note that “foreign customers regard a Part 810 
specific authorization as a cause of delay and uncertainty[] and a distinct disadvantage in procuring 
commercial nuclear technology from the United States.” Id. at attachment 1, page 9. 
26 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,829. 
27 Richard Goorevich, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., Nat’l 
Nuclear Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Energy, comments at Aug. 5, 2013, public meeting regarding the 
SNOPR, transcript page 16, available at http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/08-13-
inlinefiles/Transcript-PROPOSED%20CHANGES%20FOR%20DOE%20PART%20810.pdf. 
28 Id. at 16–17. 
29 Office of Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., supra note 19, slide 10 (emphasis in original). 
30 Id. 
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IV. COMPETING INTERESTS 
In recent years, this sought-after balance has proven to be a very 
elusive target.31 The massive scope of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks forced government leaders to consider both non-state actors and 
traditional national adversaries in the context of counter-proliferation and 
prevention of the use of weapons of mass destruction.32 
The case of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan 
particularly illustrates the extent to which the proliferation threat has 
outpaced the reach of U.S. nuclear export controls. Khan absconded from 
a Dutch nuclear fuel cycle firm in the 1980s with plans for a uranium-
enrichment centrifuge, which he used to develop Pakistan’s nuclear 
program.33 In 2003, Khan obtained U.S. technology in Malaysia to build 
equipment for enriching uranium and provided that gear to Iran and 
Libya.34 Malaysia was (and remains, pending revision of part 810) a GA 
country. 35  Despite being known to the international community as a 
proliferation bad actor, Khan and his network were able to take 
advantage of the relaxed export control restrictions afforded by 
Malaysia’s GA status, likely to the detriment of the United States and its 
allies.36 
From the industry’s perspective, the part 810 export control 
destination classification construct has had a little more success in its 
alternative goal of supporting trade opportunities for U.S. suppliers. 
Commentators reviewing the Brookings Institution’s 2009–10 survey of 
the civil nuclear industry concluded that “U.S. companies are no longer 
leading participants in the international nuclear fuel cycle.” 37 Instead, 
suppliers in China, France, Japan, Korea, and Russia have made 
considerable gains in market share in recent years. 38  Once American 
                                                        
31  See generally JOHN P. BANKS & CHARLES K. EBINGER EDS., BUSINESS AND 
NONPROLIFERATION—INDUSTRY’S ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE (2011) 
(examining the challenges that government and corporations face in dealing with modern security 
threats and emerging nuclear fuel cycle markets).  
32 Scott Jones et al., Trade Controls and International Security, in COMBATING WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION—THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 118, 126 
(Nathan E. Busch & Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009). See also Charles D. Ferguson, WMD Terrorism, 
in COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION—THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY, supra note 24, at 34–37 (describing potential scenarios in which 
terrorists could employ nuclear weapons or materials). 
33 Seema Gahlaut, South Asia and the Nonproliferation Regime, in COMBATING WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION—THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY, supra note 
32, at 222, 228. 
34 Mark Hibbs, New and Balanced Rules for U.S. Nuclear Technology Exports (Sept. 30, 
2013), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/30/new-and-balanced-rules-for-u.s.-
nuclear-technology-exports. 
35 See 10 C.F.R. § 810.8(a) (excluding Malaysia from the enumerated list of SA countries). 
Malaysia is one of the seventy-seven countries proposed to change to SA status. Supra note 10. 
36 Hibbs, supra note 34. 
37 John P. Banks and Sharon Squassoni, Commercial Nuclear Markets and Nonproliferation, in 
BUSINESS AND NONPROLIFERATION—INDUSTRY’S ROLE IN SAFEGUARDING A NUCLEAR 
RENAISSANCE, supra note 31, at 31, 34. 
38 Id. 
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giants in the field, Westinghouse and General Electric are now 
subsidiaries of or substantially owned by Asian business interests.39 
Furthermore, industry leaders claim that the financial expenses and 
time delays necessary to navigate complicated export control processes, 
such as those in part 810, serve to drive foreign and multinational 
customers to non-U.S. suppliers. 40  Apart from the quantifiable costs, 
potential customers are likely to prefer establishing trade partnerships 
with suppliers in countries offering fewer substantive restrictions and 
greater flexibility.41 
 
V. THE SNOPR: DOE’S ATTEMPT TO STRIKE A MORE EFFECTIVE 
BALANCE 
 
With these goals and challenges in mind, DoE set out in 2011 to 
overhaul part 810.42 A major component of that overhaul, the proposal to 
switch from an exclusive, negative (SA) list to an inclusive, positive 
(GA) list was intended to align the part 810 processes with other 
governmental export regimes, where the trend is to favor positive lists 
over negative lists.43 The ostensible goal is to better define those select 
countries suitable for expedited transaction approvals, resulting in more 
predictable outcomes.44 In principle, the decision to have positive lists 
rather than negative lists was not contentious. 45  However, industry 
objections would arise on the matter of how the list should be 
populated. 46  Following the 2011 notice of proposed rulemaking, NEI 
argued the following in its public comments: 
 
Had DOE simply reversed the restricted country list in 
the current rule with a “generally authorized list,” it 
would not have altered which countries are eligible for 
general authorizations. However, the generally 
authorized list in [the proposed rule] is not the inverse of 
the restricted countries list. Without explanation, the 
proposed list of generally authorized countries excludes 
                                                        
39 Id. at 36. 
40 Myers, supra note 11, attachment 1, page 8. 
41  See Hibbs, supra note 34 (contrasting U.S. efforts to require prohibitions on uranium 
enrichment or reprocessing as conditions precedent to section 123 agreements with other countries, 
like Australia and Canada, which do not impose such restrictions but still have successful 
nonproliferation programs). 
42 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 55,278. 
43 Goorevich comments, supra note 27, at 20. 
44 Id. 
45 See Letter from Hunter R. Rawlings III, President, Ass’n of American Univs., & Anthony 
DeCrappeo, President, Council on Gov’t Relations, to Richard Goorevich, Senior Policy Advisor, 
Office of Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., Nat’l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Energy, “RIN 1994-
AA02 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities” (Nov. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12856 (supporting the switch to a positive 
list as “a helpful change that will reduce uncertainties and reporting burdens for users”). 
46 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,835. 
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most countries that are now eligible for general 
authorizations under the current rule.47 
  
The drafters of the proposed rule may have promulgated the GA list 
“[w]ithout explanation” in 2011, but they have subsequently made their 
rationale very clear: GA status going forward will be tied almost 
inextricably to whether the prospective partner country has executed a 
section 123 agreement.48 In fact, every country (and the IAEA) on the 
proposed GA list either has its own bilateral section 123 agreement with 
the United States or falls under an umbrella international organization 
with such an agreement in place (such as the European Atomic Energy 
Community). 49  Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and U.A.E., all presently 
enumerated in § 810.8(a) as SA countries, each executed a section 123 
agreement during the time since the last part 810 revision. Therefore, 
they are proposed to be included on the new GA list—the only three 
current SA countries to be included.50 
On behalf of the nuclear industry, NEI objects to what it characterizes 
as the indiscriminate reclassification of the seventy-seven countries that 
will lose their GA status under the SNOPR.51 According to DoE’s own 
economic analysis, those seventy-seven countries are expected to 
generate $10 billion in new nuclear trade business by 2030.52 NEI asserts 
that subjecting those developing countries to stiffer regulatory 
requirements than were required in the recent past is likely to dissuade 
potential customers from doing business with U.S. suppliers.53 
DoE acknowledges that SA status is burdensome, but also maintains 
that the combined trade volume of these seventy-seven proposed SA 
countries is only “a very small part of the global nuclear market.”54 DoE 
further offers that the combined anticipated trade from all seventy-seven 
countries only amounts to half the combined volume from Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, and U.A.E., whose pending GA reclassification will benefit 
vendors.55                                                         
47 Myers, supra note 11, attachment 1, page 8 (emphasis added). 
48  Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,835. (listing “the 
existence of a 123 Agreement with the United States” as the first in a list of factors the Secretary of 
Energy would consider in making the non-inimicality determination prerequisite to proposing GA 
status), Goorevich comments, supra note 27, at 25 (affirming “the linkage of the positive list to the 
123 process”). It merits mention that NEI still obviously surmised this connection when it submitted 
its 2011 comments, which noted that “[b]ecause each of the forty-eight countries in the proposed 
[GA] list is covered by a Section 123 agreement, it appears that DOE is proposing to make a Section 
123 agreement a prerequisite for inclusion in the [GA] list.” Myers, supra note 11, attachment 1, at 
8. 
49 Nat’l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Energy, 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation, at 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforp
eacefulcooperation. 
50 Myers, supra note 11, attachment 1, at 8. 
51 Id. at attachment 1, page 8–9. 
52 Office of Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., Proposed Changes to DOE Part 810—Assistance 
to Foreign Nuclear Activities, supra note 19, slide 30. 
53 Myers, supra note 11, attachment 1, at 9. 
54 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,836. 
55 Id. 
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The remaining seventy-three countries on the current enumerated SA 
list (less Yugoslavia, a defunct state) would remain SA because they are 
unenumerated in the proposed rule.56 Of those seventy-three countries, it 
is important to note that China, Russia, and India—each have section 123 
agreements with the United States in force.57 They are the only countries 
who have section 123 agreements but who are not proposed for GA 
status.   
In regards to China and Russia, the purported rationale is that both 
countries have manifested a lack of “transparency” regarding the 
separation of their military nuclear explosive programs from their 
peaceful nuclear energy applications, section 123 agreements 
notwithstanding. 58  Additionally, although India also has a nuclear 
weapons program, its situation presents a different problem. The Henry 
J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
2006 (Hyde Act)59 imposes accountability requirements unique to India 
that, according to DoE, make granting India GA status “infeasible.”60 
DoE’s position is that specific authorization is necessary in India’s case 
to ensure on a case-by-case basis that these requirements are met.61 
Although DoE could assert that the trade volume attributable to the 
seventy-seven small-market countries slated to transition from GA to SA 
is paltry (insofar as $10 billion could be so considered), that case cannot 
be made concerning these three giants. The industry’s most vehement 
objections to the SNOPR probably lie against the decision to retain SA 
status for these three section 123 agreement countries, while elevating 
three others (Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and U.A.E.) to GA status. NEI asserts 
that “[t]ogether, China and India will account for half of the world’s 
planned increase in nuclear generating capacity by 2030.”62 By DoE’s 
own accounting, that volume would equal or exceed hundreds of billions 
of dollars.63 Therefore, the industry’s objection to the exclusion of these 
three countries comes as no surprise. 
                                                         
56 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,849–50. 
57 Nat’l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Energy, 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation, 
supra note 49. 
58 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,837. 
59 22 U.S.C. 8001 (2012). As stated in the text associated with note 16 supra, Congress must 
approve all section 123 agreements. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 indirectly precludes 
approval of any agreement on nuclear cooperation with any country—like India—that is not a 
signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Quentin Michel, The Control 
of International Nuclear Trade—Difficult Balance Between Trade Development and Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW: HISTORY, EVOLUTION AND 
OUTLOOK—10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF NUCLEAR LAW 271, 298 
(ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY 
2010). The Hyde Act carved an exception to that requirement applicable only to India so that the 
Bush Administration could complete a section 123 agreement with that country. Id. at 298-99. 
60 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,837. 
61 Id. 
62 Myers, supra note 11, attachment 1, at 10. 
63  See Office of Nonproliferation and Int’l Sec., “Proposed Changes to DOE Part 810—
Assistance to Foreign Nuclear Activities,” supra note 19, slide 30 (projecting new reactor 
construction and associated trade volume exceeding $1.5 trillion by 2030). 
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VI. ASSESSMENT AND LIKELY OUTCOMES  
 
A revised part 810 final rule should be published sometime in 2014.64 
The industry will likely enjoy relief in the form of process improvements 
that occur outside the scope of the SNOPR to reduce the time it takes for 
the Secretary of Energy to authorize transactions with SA countries,65 but 
is unlikely to prevail on its objections to the increased number of SA 
countries or the continuation of SA status for China, Russia, and India. 
Assuming that the final promulgated rule reflects the SNOPR as 
written, the industry’s prospects to successfully challenge the revised 
rule would be poor. Tethering GA status to prospective countries’ section 
123 status is neither arbitrary nor capricious, even with the option to 
maintain SA classification for good cause despite a section 123 
agreement as in the cases of China and Russia. If anything, the proposed 
changes could be construed as a tacit admission by DoE that the GA 
standards presently in force may have been too lax. In any event, because 
AEA § 57b does not prescribe a definition or standard for “inimical,” 
courts are likely to afford significant deference to DoE’s interpretation 
and assessment of the best mechanism to determine inimicality.66 Any 
legal challenge to the final rule as proposed would probably not survive 
summary judgment. 
Administrative law principles aside, the proposed country 
classification scheme—along with the country-by-country 
determinations proposed—is grounded in defensible policy 
considerations and represents the right way ahead for SNM technology 
export control. DoE correctly asserts in the SNOPR’s Federal Register 
notice that “any anticipated additional burdens do not overcome the 
sound national security reasons for the Department’s proposed approach 
to classification of foreign destination.”67 
However, this is not to suggest that the commercial trade implications 
are unimportant or ought not be considered. Promoting robust nuclear 
trade is essential for the United States to maintain international 
relevance—not only commercially, but also in the security arena. Such 
high regulatory hurdles that extinguish nuclear trade altogether would 
undercut nonproliferation goals by diminishing the United States’ ability 
to influence developing nations’ practices and policies. 
On the other hand, U.S. regulators should feel no pressure to loosen 
export controls or hasten processes solely to match what other supplier 
countries may be doing—or more importantly, may not be doing. A 
“race to the bottom” in the arena of nuclear security can only lead to a                                                         
64 See Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 16,238 (promulgated 
Mar. 25, 2014) (extending public comment period until Apr. 2, 2014). 
65 See, e.g., id., slides 30 (describing DoE initiatives, separate and distinct from the regulatory 
changes in the SNOPR, to improve the part 810 specific authorization process). 
66  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(establishing the standard for judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged to 
administer). 
67 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities, supra note 1, at 46,836. 
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horrific finish. Thus, the proposed changes in the SNOPR will keep the 
United States above that hypothetical fray. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Regulators and nuclear industry leaders are sure to grapple with how 
best to balance market competition with nonproliferation for as long as 
nuclear power exists. A healthy debate that considers both ends of the 
spectrum is the most effective way to achieve an approximation of 
balance between these concerns. However, the stakes are far too high to 
shortsightedly pursue profit at the expense of security. By continuing a 
security-first approach, the proposed changes to the SNM technology 
export control regulations will maintain the best balance possible.  
 
